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b757captain

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b757captain last won the day on July 10 2015

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About b757captain

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  1. Just a follow-up on the FS16473 mix: I tried most all the suggestions from everyone but finally came up with this: It's a mix of Tamiya XF-23 Light Blue, 1 part: XF-66 Light Grey, 2 parts: and XF-1 White, 14 parts. The mix I found from the IPMS site said 23:1, 66:2, and 1:7 but Tamiya's idea of Light Grey isn't very light. This ratio looked way too dark for me so I kept adding white until it looked right. A better mix would be only 1 part XF-66 to 7 parts white. To my eye it looks right and now that I've got decals on it looks even better. Stay tuned, I'll post the completed model in the Non LSP Works section as soon as I get the last bits put on. Thanks for all the suggestions! Mark
  2. https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-04-05/experts-say-ethiopian-air-pilots-failed-do-one-thing-could-have-prevented-deadly
  3. I stand by every single thing I have written. Feel free to move this to PM if you wish. Mark
  4. I've stayed out of the conversation for the last few days waiting for the preliminary report. It's out and - sorry guys - I stick by my original assessment 100%. The ET crew did not - I repeat - did not! follow the proper procedures. As follows: According to the report and FDR traces published, The left AOA signal started sending bad info at about 100 ft after liftoff, or 10 to 15 seconds after liftoff. The report says that the stick shaker activated almost immediately after the AOA data bad signal so they were getting stick shaker and left & right airspeed and altitude disagree within 200 ft above the ground. There is no CVR transcript attached to the report so no time stamps for how the crew reacted to this. The only indication in the report is that the FO called out a master caution alert at around 400 AGL. Another telling thing coming from the report is that the throttles (actually engine rpm) never moved from takeoff power, staying at ~94% for almost the entire flight. UA checklist memory item #4: with flaps extended, set power at 80%. So next action for the captain was to request autopilot engagement. Four times. With unreliable airspeed and stick shaker. The UA checklist memory item #1: Autopilot disengage! Then it seems the next actions were to continue as if the flight was normal (with the stick shaker buzzing merrily away and all kinds of UA warnings) and for the next minute or so the climbout continued and the flaps were retracted. Keep in mind that MCAS will not activate with the flaps extended. The problems only started when the flaps were up then MCAS activated and went through an entire first 10 second nose-down cycle before the (presumably) captain intervened. That's 10 seconds of continuous nose down trim while hand-flying and the trim wheel noisily clacking away. That's when things went pear-shaped. I won't parse the remainder of the flight except to say that within minutes the captain's airspeed indicated over 340 knots and the FO's over 360 knots. I revert back to my previous posts as to why this is bad. Mike, I watched the first portion of the vid you posted but when the guy just read the report and skipped to the trim problem I stopped watching. The entire first segment of the flight (unreliable airspeed) is what started the final chain of events and he didn't even mention it. In my previous post I said that the local investigators would try to spin this in their favor and make Boeing the bad guy. I was entirely correct - did anyone notice that for a day prior to the report release the Ethiopian CAA put out press releases that their crew did the Boeing procedure? Then in the actual report cite references to the trim problem but completely skip the unreliable airspeed problem and that MCAS did not activate until after the crew did not address the unreliable airspeed, stick shaker and other indicators first? Nowhere in the UA checklist does it say ignore all the warnings, call flaps up and press on. It just doesn't say that. May I make a suggestion? I'm directing this towards 2 guys who have posted derogatory things about Boeing airplanes (one guy in particular). Can we please leave the Boeing sucks/Airbus is great/Boeing is great/Airbus sucks talk to the other websites? Airbus makes a good product but it's not perfect and has flaws which pop up from time to time, same as Boeing but this may not be the forum to get into mud-slinging or johnson-measuring contests. I'm still working on part 3 of my rant concerning modern pilot training techniques (some of which directly point to deficiencies in how both of these accidents were handled) but I gotta fly tomorrow and it's time to relax for the evening. Cheers, Mark
  5. I think we've got a chicken/egg thing here - I'd blame the paint manufacturers first, they are the ones creating color names, we're just using them! Mark
  6. Gloss coat. I almost exclusively paint the base coat flat then gloss to taste. Works great. Most modern automotive two stage and three stage finishes are like this also, the color coat is flat and dries to a coverable or repairable state in minutes, then clear coat.
  7. I'll take a look at the Mr Color 73. I did see a reference for Tamiya which was XF-23:1, XF-66:2 and XF-2:7. Looks like I'll be doing some experimenting over the next few days! Thanks guys!
  8. I don't have access to my trusty stash of MM ADC Gray here in Japan. I'm currently set up for Mr. Color and Tamiya paints (the regulars ones, not the goofy Acrysion, etc.). Neither has a color listing for FS 16473 which I need for the topcoat on the KH F-101B I'm working on. Anybody have a quick solution besides switching to Vallejo or another paint brand? I'd prefer to stick with what I'm using for now at least. I'm not against mixing up a brew of Tamiya since I have access to the full line here. Mr. Color also but sometimes it takes trips to several stores to find the more obscure colors. Thanks! Mark san
  9. Jay, you and guys like you are why I step into my cockpit with total confidence. Mark
  10. As far as I know, the AOA sensors are the same and most of the FCC/ADC (Flight Control Computer.Air Data Computer) architecture is the same on the NG but obviously the MCAS was added to the mix for the Max. The AOA sensor failure rate cannot be very high or it would have been added into the recurrent training syllabuses. I don't get to see the maintenance side of things too often anymore but don't think it's common at all. I'll put my money on botched repairs as a contributing factor in at least one of the accidents. In all my career I have flown exactly one (tail number, not type!) airplane with an AOA indicator (Lear 25) and after the novelty wore off - about two flights - I never used it. If a modern commercial airplane is flown as it should the AOA indicator is not a necessity or even a luxury, it's a piece of unnecessary equipment. The disagree warning, on the other hand, might be useful but obviously training would be required to know what it means, what it affects and what to do about it. On the fence here because it adds information to a non-normal situation, but is it really useful information to help me deal with the problem? Remember, my job is not to diagnose and repair the airplane in flight (crashes have happened because of this syndrome) but to deal with an aircraft problem by finding a safe configuration that allows me to either continue the flight or divert to a safe landing. Cheers, Mark
  11. Yep, my opinion is Boeing blew it with the MDD buyout (Mulally was the last good CEO) and they cemented the change from an engineer-oriented company to whatever they are now. The HQ move to Chicago to me proves it and the 787 design disaster was a direct result. All because the MDD heads took over. B still has good products but the Max issue shows they need a top-down house cleaning to return to engineering fundamentals. Having said that, in both these crashes the initiator might have been (probably was) the MCAS but the outcomes were completely due to incompetent pilots. Not pilot error. Pilot incompetence. That, unfortunately, will become more and more widespread in years to come. Details in my Rant #3. I really want to see both CVR transcripts too. I hold no hope for an honest accounting from either Ethiopia or Indonesia - both countries have long histories of protecting their reputations and blaming any and all outside parties regardless of the evidence, even if it's obvious. We'll see. Mark
  12. Working on a PM for ya Alan - just finished an online pizza order here in Japan and it's wiped my limited brain power for the evening! Mark
  13. Since there didn't seem to be any violent objections to my previous opinions, I will continue: Not as long a rant today, I'm just going to touch on the similarities of the two accidents and why things developed as they did. Still no definitive info on the ET crash but supposedly there has been a leaked tidbit which said the MCAS was activated. Also the horizontal jackscrew was found in the wreckage and was in the full nose down trim position. So. I previously touched on what would happen to the trim position if MCAS was activated and left alone. It would run - in two 10 second bursts - to full nose down trim. Then it stops cuz it can't go any farther. Now step back a minute and think about aircraft certification criteria. One of thousands of requirements (which affects not only large airplanes but virtually ALL aircraft) is the requirement that the airplane be controllable with the trim either in the full nose down or nose up position. I admit I am a little fuzzy on the full range of this requirement (AE degree long in my past and only on elective course on this subject) but I know it has to cover at least the speed range for approach, possibly up to maneuvering speed but doubtful it applies to the entire speed envelope. So, with the trim at full nose down the airplane is still fully controllable at approach speeds and some range higher than that. Now lets look at one strangely similar data parameter of both crashes. Lion Air by FDR traces and ET so far only by ADS-B and radar data (which is suspect but based on the large impact crater probably pretty close to accurate). The last level flight moments of both flights showed speeds in excess of 330 knots. Huh? Repeat. Huh? All I can say is Whaaaat?? Both flights were conducted in day VMC conditions, so weather was not a factor. Why on earth would anyone feel the necessity to park a sick airplane on or beyond the barber pole? If the stick shaker is going off and you think you're stalled I seriously doubt that a trip to max forward speed is required to determine you're not stalled. I know the reason for this which I will get into in part 3 of this rant but suffice to say, 4 guys totally forgot (or never new how) to fly the airplane. For goodness sake, look out the dang window. If you can't tell the difference between 100 knots and 330+ knots at low altitude you're in the wrong business. In ET case they never got much above 1000 ft. above the ground. Umm, noticeable, I think. So why is the speed so important? Speed is life, right? Well, not in this case. There's a phenomenon that affects all airplanes (not just the 737 but slightly more prevalent in the 737 due to the makeup of the hydraulic systems) called control surface blowdown. In essence, at some point the air loads due to higher airspeeds are too great for the hydraulic systems to overcome and the commanded control surface deflection cannot be achieved. So in the case of Lion Air (and probably Ethiopian) as they let the speed increase well past takeoff/climb/approach speed through maneuvering speed and up to redline, pulling harder on the yoke did nothing. Actually the reverse happened. As the speed increased the elevator deflection decreased, reducing effectiveness even more. I haven't studied the possibility of an elevator stall (possible but not germain because frankly it's not relevant) but it probably explains the final sudden nose dive. So why did they decide to fly at such high speeds? We don't know yet but I have my suspicions and it directly points to a major, major failing in the way pilots are trained in the EFIS, computer controlled era. Both times both heads were wrapped up in solving the flashing lights and scary alarms and THEY FORGOT TO FLY THE AIRPLANE. Rule number 1 Next up, some personal observations concerning pilot skills at one of the aforementioned airlines and some general comments about why when I retire I'll never set foot on another commercial airliner again!. Maybe a little harsh but I'll definitely be selective about who I fly on. I guess I'll have to change my moniker from B757Captain to Sailboat Captain then. Cheers, Mark
  14. I've been avoiding commenting anywhere on this issue but I do have .02c to throw into the pot: Disclaimer: I'm currently flying the NG version of the 737 (800), have not flown the Max nor have I done the differences course. My airline plans to acquire the Max but no orders yet. I've flown the -200, -300, -400, -700 and -800. The 737 is the second highest flight time aircraft for me next to the 757 (which IMHO was the best airplane design since the DC-3!). Disclaimer #2: I flew the 737 at Ethiopian Airlines for a year (back in 2014/early 2015. I have some inside knowledge about pilot training issues there and pilot abilities. More on that in a moment. Firstly, Boeing deserves a large roundhouse to the noggin for the MCAS. Poorly designed system slapped together to fix a late-term flight test issue. However, Boeing DOES NOT deserve all the criticism and grief it's getting over the ET and Lion Air crashes. Remember that as of yet there is NO official information out to the public on the Ethiopian crash, so for a moment I will focus on the Lion Air crash. As I have read, the Lion Air crash was the 3rd consecutive flight (or consecutive flight day, can't remember which) for essentially the same set of problems. So the accident crew was not the first to see the issue, only the crew who mismanaged it. Harsh? Unfeeling? How dare I? Read on. As I have read and have seen briefings on that crash, the crew experienced two things simultaneously - unreliable airspeed (or airspeed disagree) and stick shaker on lift-off. Ok, first thing. The 737 QRH (Quick Reference Handbook (emergency checklists to the uninitiated)) has a few memory items for this problem. Autopilot off, Autothrottles off, and set pitch and power to match conditions. In their case, 10 degrees nose up and 80% power for climb. After the airplane is stable then continue with the checklist. The checklist specifically says that the stick shaker may activate, the overspeed warning may activate and the airspeed low warning may activate. Possibly all simultaneously. So they actually did not have multiple system failures, they had one: airspeed unreliable. What?? you say? As one continues through the Airspeed Unreliable checklist, which goes on for 5 pages (attempting to isolate the failure) not once does the checklist direct the pilots to retract the flaps. Not once. Why is this important? Because MCAS is only active with the flaps up! And they had Flaps 5 deployed for takeoff. Think about that before blaming Boeing. The accident crew failed to perform even the memory items on the Unreliable Airspeed checklist (shown from the FDR traces published - aka, pitch, power not as checklist says), and later in the flight by retracting the flaps they caused the very issue (MCAS activation) which should never have happened in the first place had they followed the steps in the UA checklist. It gets murkier. Rumor has it that a Lion Air mechanic was on the jumpseat to troubleshoot the problem. I can't point to the specific article that says that, going on memory here. Does anyone (else) think it strange that 2 months after the CVR was found there has been no transcript published (or leaked)? Did the mechanic direct the accident crew to do something they shouldn't have? And that's why the CVR transcript is being withheld (contrary to Indonesian law)? And finally, ok, the crew messes up, gets themselves boxed into a corner, flaps are retracted and MCAS activates. When MCAS activates it runs the trim nose down for a 10 second interval, pauses for 5 seconds, then runs again for 10 seconds. For the uninitiated, the MCAS can run the trim twice. No more. How do I know? Because normal takeoff trim values are around 5 units of trim. 10 seconds of (low speed) trim activation gets you 2.5 units. So twice runs the trim to full nose down. Then it stops. And the PF (pilot flying) sits there wondering why he's pulling on the yoke with about 50 pounds of force to keep the nose up. Clue: look at the trim. Basic flying 101. So apparently the accident crew fought the nose down trim by applying nose up trim (which deactivates MCAS) several times, only to see the trim start running nose down again. What a head scratcher!!! Since they did not know about MCAS (black eye for Boeing, no argument from me) this looks suspiciously like a runaway trim! Golly, is there a checklist for that? Hallelujah, there is! So lets look at the runaway trim checklist. It has some memory items. First, disconnect the Autopilot and Autothrottles. Next, if the trim continues to run, apply opposite yoke pressure. In their case, already happening. Next, STAB TRIM CUTOUT SWITCHES - CUTOUT. If that doesn't stop the trim movement, grasp and hold the trim wheel. That WILL stop the trim! And all 737s have the stab trim cutout switches, all in the exact same place. MCAS will deactivate if the cutout switches are used. Then manually trim the airplane. So the accident crew not only failed to do the appropriate checklist the first time (Unreliable Airspeed) they failed to do the appropriate checklist (Stab Trim Runaway) subsequently (the need for which they themselves created). I have absolutely no sympathy for the accident crew. None. Whatsoever. I feel sad for the passengers that they were victims in this, but the crew was 100% at fault. If you like my ranting, stay tuned. We'll talk more about the ET crash, plus my ramblings about the changes in pilot training in general in the last 20 or so years (disclaimer: 32 year flying career, learned the old-school way!) Oh, and another (can't keep track of what number) disclaimer: I have had a stab trim runaway on a 737-300. Gents, when it happens, you definitely know it! Cheers, Mark
  15. Thanks John! Thanks Ron! It was an enjoyable build!
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