Evolution of the Luftwaffe fighters of WW II

[Gerhard]

Found this on a FB group that I am a member of. Very interesting and thought some of you guys might finds it useful.

 

 

 

Edited December 11, 2017 by Gerhard

[Dpgsbody55]

Interesting study.  Thanks for posting.  I wonder if we'll ever see a 109B, C or D in injection plastic 1/32??

 

 

Cheers,

Michael

[1to1scale]

Cutting Edge made a nice conversion in 1/32 for the 109C, I lost out on bidding yesterday, i lost interest at $85. 

[LSP_Ron]

Kinda interesting that basically two airframes had to contend with so many other designs. P-47, P-51, Hurri, Spitty, Typhoon, Tempest, P-40, P-38, Mig 3, to name a few

[Hardcore]

Add the Japanese and Italian sides to axis side

[Gigant]

Adolf Galland did a lot of damage with the Me-262.

[Bstarr3]

I read an interesting article once that said basically this was the Luftwaffe's problem in a nutshell: they had neither the design nor manufacturing potential to keep up with the Allies. Instead, they kept making more and more modifications to two existing airframes. The net result is that the 109, one of the fastest and most maneuverable planes in the world in 1939, was completely outmatched by its opponents by 1945

[RLWP]

I read an interesting article once that said basically this was the Luftwaffe's problem in a nutshell: they had neither the design nor manufacturing potential to keep up with the Allies. Instead, they kept making more and more modifications to two existing airframes. The net result is that the 109, one of the fastest and most maneuverable planes in the world in 1939, was completely outmatched by its opponents by 1945

 

Plus keeping them in the air was becoming a nightmare. Carrying spares for many different builds of the same 'plane is not the way to win a war. Better to just build another Spitfire/Lancaster/P-40, and when they are outclassed change to a new plane

 

Richard

[Lud13]

I read an interesting article once that said basically this was the Luftwaffe's problem in a nutshell: they had neither the design nor manufacturing potential to keep up with the Allies. Instead, they kept making more and more modifications to two existing airframes. The net result is that the 109, one of the fastest and most maneuverable planes in the world in 1939, was completely outmatched by its opponents by 1945

 

At the end of the war Bf 109K-4 and Fw 190D-9 was more than capable to fight against what allies had. What was the real problem was  quality of average Jagdflieger that was way lover than average allied fighter pilot. Most of the experten where long gone at that time and those few that where still fighting was more interesting in their own survival than fighting in the lost war.  So if u have two machines with comparable performance its up to the pilot in the cockpit and that was where the Luftwaffe failed.

Edited January 4, 2018 by Lud13

[Bstarr3]

Another interesting note is that the Luftwaffe kept their best pilots in the field, while the Allies rotated them back to train new pilots.  VC, MOH, and NC winners were routinely back off the frontlines training their replacements for a large part of the war.  I've also read this as an explanation for why the Luftwaffe has so many more claimed kills per pilot, and their aces outstrip the Allies by orders of magnitude - lots more flight hours. 

[Hardcore]

Plus keeping them in the air was becoming a nightmare. Carrying spares for many different builds of the same 'plane is not the way to win a war. Better to just build another Spitfire/Lancaster/P-40, and when they are outclassed change to a new plane

 

Richard

Not really. Most of the parts where interchangeable between versions. Now and then you see photo of an which shows this. An example is that nightfighter Bf109G-6AS discussed here (?) on the forum. It was not that easy to identify for a layman.

[Gazzas]

The real failure of the Luftwaffe was lack of preparation.  With 700 more fighters in 1943, they would have been able to stop US Daylight raids before the Jug and Mustang arrived.  Until the arrival of the USAAF, they were just keeping up with losses in machines and pilots.  There was also a lack of staff officers.  The Luftwaffe was a young service, and it wasn't managed up to it's potential.

 

By the time the emergency measures were put in place,  it was too late.  Bomber and transport pilots converted to fighters were poor at leaving behind their old flying habits.  Hastily trained pilots couldn't compete with pilots who had many more flight hours in training.   Lack of fuel prevented proper training for converting pilots and new pilots alike.  

 

And there was a period from late 43' to late 44' where the 190 and 109 were at performance disadvantages to the Mustang and Jug.

[Bstarr3]

Basically the entire German war strategy was

 

1. Conquer world

2. Nobody will fight back

3. ?????

4. Profit!!!!

 

After an incredible start, they were on their back foot from late '42 on, between the stall out at Stalingrad and the Allied conquest of north Africa. They never seemed to envision that they needed to continue to ramp up production of materiel in order to maintain their position. They seemed like an unstoppable juggernaut in 1940, but the war was never winnable for them the way it was conceived and prosecuted. 

[Gigant]

Basically the entire German war strategy was

 

1. Conquer world

2. Nobody will fight back

3. ?????

4. Profit!!!!

 

After an incredible start, they were on their back foot from late '42 on, between the stall out at Stalingrad and the Allied conquest of north Africa. They never seemed to envision that they needed to continue to ramp up production of materiel in order to maintain their position. They seemed like an unstoppable juggernaut in 1940, but the war was never winnable for them the way it was conceived and prosecuted. 

 

They seriously underestimated American resources provided both to G.B and the U.S.S.R. before Dec. 7, 1941, in terms of fuel, motor vehicles, munitions, aircraft, and armor which prevented the defeat of both empires.

 

For instance, the defeat of Rommel in Africa hinged upon the development and delivery of the Lee, then the Sherman tanks (at the request of the British, by the way) fitted with 75mm guns that could stop the typical German tank.

 

Then they seriously underestimated American fighting spirit.

 

Unlike the Europeans, the American flyers did not play by the "more gentlemanly rules" established before they got there. Instead they went by the "kill or be killed" doctrine experienced with the A.V.G. fighting the Japanese, whose volunteers were assimilated into the U.S. Army Air Force at the declared outbreak of hostilities and became instrumental in training new pilots who were sent to the E.T.O.

As a "for instance", most Me-262's were downed upon take-off and landing, both are a pilot's most vulnerable moments, by swarms of P-51's.

 

Finally, they underestimated American aircraft designers whose "Coups De Grace" to the Luftwaffe was, according a book I have titled "Night Fighters", in fact the P-61 Black Widow night fighter, which demoralized the Luftwaffe to the extent, their commander ordered his to "stand-down".

Edited January 10, 2018 by Gigant

[Bstarr3]

That's interesting re: the P-61. I had always understood that they were, like the P-38, a relative flop in the ETO, at least compared to their roles in the Pacific.

 

Agree that both Axis powers seriously and critically underestimated the fighting spirit and prowess of their opponents, especially the Germans against the Russians and the Japanese against us.